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Summary  findings
The cost of complying with environmental regulations  After controlling for the impact of factor price
has been cited as a major burden on businesses. Is it  differentials, infrastructure,  and agglomeration, they find
enough of a burden to influence where businesses locate  that the number of new plants commissioned in different
new plants, which are not restricted in their choice of  states of India in 1994 does not appear to be adversely
location?  affected by more stringent environmental enforcement at
Mani, Pargal, and Huq examine a unique  the state level. In other words, an environmental "race to
establishment level dataset to find out whether the  the bottom"  is unlikely.
stringency of environmental regulation affects where  They find that the level of existing business activity
firms locate new plants. Using a conditional logit model,  overwhelms all other factors affecting location decisions.
they estimate the importance of different variables in  Reliable infrastructure and factors of production  are also
plant location choice.  critical.
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The cost of complying with environmental  regulations has been cause for complaint by businesses
the world over. At the same time. the view that jurisdictions would compete to attract new investment by
lowering environmental  standards has led to much anguish over a possible enviromnental "race to the
bottom".  If these regulations are indeed as onerous as industry alleges, we would expect to find significant
differences in the observed volume of new business activity across locations which vary in environmental
stringency, ceteris paribus.  Since new firms are not restricted in their choice of location by sunk costs, an
examination of new firmn  location decisions would allow one to disentangle the impact of environrmental
regulations from other factors affecting the decision. This paper uses a unique establishment level dataset
from India to test this proposition.
Following Schmenner's (1982) qualitative study of the factors motivating US businesses to locate
where thev do, existing empirical work has found mixed evidence  of a locational impact of environmental
regulation when comparing new business location choices across US states.  Among the recent
establishment level studies. Bartik (1985), Schwab and McConnell (1990), and Levinson (1995) have all
followed Carlton (1983) in using conditional logit models to estimate the impact of different variables on
firm profits as reflected in firm location decisions. Schwab and McConnell. analysing the US motor
vehicle industry, find that at the margin. firms tend to avoid so called "non-attainment" areas where
environmental  enforcement tends to be tightest.  Levinson (1995) finds evidence that new branch plants of
large multiplant firms locate in states with the least stringent environmental regulations.
For developing  countries. data has been sparse.  For instance, a firm level study by Henderson and
Kuncoro (1996) has analysed the centralization of manufacturing activity in Indonesia, but ignored the
effects of regulation. In India the impact of environmental  regulation on the spatial distribution of industry
has not attracted much academic attention. Casual empiricism on state level competition for new
investment has not been followed by rigorous studies of the phenomenon. Also, the focus of most work on
3intergovernmental  relations has been fiscal federalism rather than environmental performance, with Gupta
(1996) being an important exception.  Based on an inspection of secondary data, Gupta cannot conclude
that states compete for investment by lowering environmental  standards.  He does not, however, preclude
the possibility of states using environmental  enforcement  as a means of differentiation in order to attract
new industry.
This is one of the first analyses of the impact of environmental  regulations on locational choice in a
developing  country.  We have information on all new industrial projects over the size of Rs. 500 million
commissioned  in India in calendar 1994. The large size of these investments makes it reasonable to
suppose that they are relatively footloose.  Our establishment level data also allows us to avoid problems of
plant closings and expansions that inevitably contaminate more aggregate measures of new business
activity.  Finally, having information on "greenfield" investment is as close to ideal as it gets.
After controlling for the impact of factor price differentials. infrastructure, and agglomeration we
find that the number of proposed new plants in different states of India is not affected by the stringency of
environmental  enforcement at the state level. Interestingly, plant location is significantly positively related
to the level of environmental spending by the state govenmuent,  which leads us to conjecture that this
variable proxies other qualities of the state government  rather than environmental stringency.
Restricting our analvsis to five highly polluting manufacturing sectors'. we found a more
significant but positive impact of environmental  enforcement on location, and a very strong positive effect
of environmental  spending. We conclude from this that the stringency of enforcement of environmental
regulations certainly does not have an adverse impact on the relative attractiveness of different sites for
industrial location, and thus that it is not as important for investors as other attributes of potential sites.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I briefly describes environmental  regulation in India.
Our basic model is described in section 2, and the factors affecting business location discussed in section 3.
' The five  most polluting  sectors  identified  here are chemicals,  rubber.  paper. metals  and non-metallic  mineral
products.
4Data sources and description are provided in section 4.  Section 5 presents our results, with conclusions in
section 6.
1.  Industrial  regulation  in India
There is a basic division of power between  the centre and the states in India, reflecting the federal
nature of the Indian Constitution.  The mandate of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is to set
environmental  standards for all plants in India. lay down ambient standards, and coordinate the activities of
the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs).  The implementation of environmental laws and their
enforcement. however. are decentralized. and are the responsibility of the SPCBs.  Anecdotal evidence
suggests w  ide variations in enforcement across the states.  In fact it has been argued (Gupta 1996) that
although states cannot compete by lowering environmental  standards. they can get around this by lax
enforcement in order to attract new investment.
From the mid 195  Os  until 1991, when a major liberalization and economic reform program was
launched. the central government effectively  dictated the location and magnitude of private investment in
India through the svstem of industrial licensing (Gupta 1996). Thus. although India has had stringent
pollution regulation on the books for a couple of decades. and there is wide variation in the industrial
climate across the country. firms may not have been able to factor these comparisons into their location
decisions until fairly recentlv. After the removal of licensing controls. the pattern of new industrial
investment reflects a rational response to expected profitability across states.  To the extent that history and
agglomeration  effects matter. however, the inertia in the system may be insurmountable!
The two main pollution control statutes in India are the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act of 1974.,  and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act which came into being in
1981. Parliament passed the Environment (Protection)  Act in 1986.  This was designed to act as umbrella
legislation for the environment. with responsibility for administering the new legislation  falling on the
5Central and State Boards.  Before 1988 enforcement was only through criminal prosecutions initiated by
the State Boards and by restraint injunctions. Boards can now, however, force closure of non compliant
plants. as well as cut off their water and power by administrative fiat (Gupta 1996).
II.  Econometric specification
Our basic premise is that new firms are free to locate anywhere in the country and that they are
profit maximizers. Since they are rational, location choice is conditioned by expectations of where
production is likely to be most profitable: firms are assumed to locate where revenues are perceived to be
highest and costs loNvest.
The restricted profit function of a representative  new firm, i. located in state j, can be written as:
-rZj(p,,  w,; sj) = pj.y(pj)-C(wj,y;sj),  where p is output price. w is a vector of factor prices, v is output, s is a
vector of location specific fixed factors and C is the cost of production.  As usual, an/ap>o,  and  Ianlw<0.
For large plants, such as those being analysed here, there is a single nationwide market.  So we
ignore possible variations in output price and market size in our study, and focus on regulatory and factor
price differences  across states.  Naturally, we look also at immobile factors that affect production costs by
changing the productivitv and thus the effective price and availability of inputs across states.
Letting x represent the vector of input prices and state characteristics, our reduced form model for
profits of firm i in state j is Tr,,  =F(xj).  Following Carlton (1983), we assume a multiplicative specification
for profits and fornulate  the empirical model as: F(xj)= ym ln(xjm)Im where m refers to the mth
characteristic of location j.  Thus. trij  = Em  ln(xjm)1m  + e 1,  with eij assumed independent  of all Eik.  kij.  For
each firm. i, the choice of state j is made s.t.  irj  2Tik  for all koj, i.e. ymln(xjm)1m  + E;  ŽSmln(xm)m  + ei
Long run expected profits for firm i are maximized in the chosen state j.
Given that firms maximize profits, and assuming an iid Weibull distribution for the error term,
location choice probabilities can be estimated using McFadden's (1974) conditional  logit model. The
6probabilitv of choosing state j is given by P, = expF(xj)/Ek expF(xk), where k indexes the different possible
locations available. Thus the marginal impact of a percentage change in factor m on the probability of
locating in state j can be calculated as: aPj /aln xjm= aPj  /axjm.\jm  = Pj(l- Pj):m.
The lid assumption for the error terms in the empirical specification above implies "the
independence  of irrelevant alternatives". which is difficult to assume for our model of location choice
across states. We have hence included  regional dummies in our model to account for the effect of
correlated disturbances within regions. This is equivalent  to the nested logit approach, and mitigates the
impact of the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" restriction on predicted probabilities (see Bartik
1985 and Levinson 1995).
III.  Factors  affecting firm location choice
TIhe  following section briefly discusses the variables we have used in our analysis.  Profits equal
revenues minus costs, where revenues are determined  by market size and the elasticity of demand. As
mentioned above, the demand side is not expected  to vary significantly with location since the plants under
consideration are large and have sales all over the country.
On the cost side. input prices and qualitv are expected to have a major bearing on profits.  We have
used the state level manufacturing wage, and electricity  price as the prices of two critical factors that vary
widelv across states.  Since wages will also reflect the qualitv of human capital, we are agnostic about the
sign of their net effect in the location decision. In addition, the quality of the labor force can be captured
through two other variables: the middle school enrollment rate as a proxy for education levels; and the
extent of work disruptions due to strikes and other labor disputes.  Middle school enrollment appears to be
more relevant for our analysis than literacv or percent college educated since industrial workers typically
have completed secondary school. The costs of labor unrest are high and need to be controlled for in the
7Indian context.  Anecdotal evidence, for instance, suggests that the two communist ruled states (Kerala and
West Bengal) are least attractive to business due to frequent labor disputes.
Population density is used as a rough gauge of land prices as well as an indicator of the magnitude
of the possible damage caused by pollution.  Both these factors would tend to make more densely populated
areas less attractive to firms.
The quality and availability of infrastructure also affect overall costs and thus the profitability of
enterprises.  We have two variables measuring infrastructure: road density per square km as a measure of
the transportation network and thus the cost and availability of materials inputs; and the proportion of
electricity demand that is unfulfilled due to power shortages.  Our expectation a priori was that firms are
rationed in terms of power availability in India and thus that the level of power shortages would be a
binding constraint on industrial activity.
Other costs of doing business come from regulations of every kind. While basic laws and tax
levels do not vary across the country, the government  has often sought to attract business through various
forms of subsidies for locating in particularly poor or "backward" districts.  Our data does not include
enough plants located in backward areas to allow us to reliably detennine the factors important in such
plants' location decisions.  Variations in regulatory costs can also come from the strength of enforcement
and monitoring which differ from state to state and can be particularly sensitive  to local conditions. In
addition, state "development expenditure", which is aimed at improving living conditions,  may result in a
more attractive business climate.
The level of environmental regulation in different Indian states is measured by two variables: the
share of spending for environment  and ecology (excluding forestr'  and wildlife conservation) in total Plan
expenditures; and the total number of environmental  cases (under the Air and Water Acts) brought by each
SPCB. normalized bv the number of large and medium plants in the state. 2 The two variables are not
2 The initiation  of litigation is one of the few  ways  in which an SPCB  can take action against  non-compliant  plants.
8correlated, and appear to measure very different aspects of government activity.  We were able to obtain
SPCB expenditure figures for only 8 of the 14 states in our sample. so decided to use the normalized
number of cases as a proxy for regulatory stringency. Plan spending on the environment  can be used as an
indicator of general interest in environmental  issues, and, we feel, also, as an indicator of the general
quality of government. In addition, we have used per capita state GDP to capture a host of other attractive
factors including  the average quality of governnent, the labor force, and infrastructure.
Finally, we include the value of total manufacturing activity in the state to proxy the advantages
that result from feedback or agglomeration  effects: firms locate where hubs of activity already exist. 3
These can result from a variety of interactions. including  inter-firm technological "knowledge  networks",
the availability of appropriate business and government  services in centres of activity over a particular size
threshold, as well as standard complementarities  and positive spillovers from using facilities and suppliers
used bv other plants.4
Summary statistics on the data used in our analysis are provided in Table I and the correlation
matrix in Table 2.
IV.  Data and estimation.
The data on business location decisions used in this study comes from the database of investment
projects put together by the Economic  Intelligence  Service of the Center for Monitoring the Indian
Economv (CMIE).  This database lists all investment  projects that entail a capital expenditure of at least
Rs. 500 million. Of the 462 new manufacturing projects that were commissioned  in 1994. the 418 projects
in the 14 largest industrial states in India were used in this studV 5. The state-wise breakdown of these
projects is listed in Figure I. and the sectoral breakdown in Figure II.  The majoritv of new investment went
See Arthur (1990).
1  For some  more  detail see Henderson  and Kuncoro  (1996) and Wheeler  and Mody  (1992).
5 There  were 1300  new investment  projects  overall.  but onlv  462 in the manufacturing  sector. Of  these, 44 were
not considered  because  of non-availability  of corresponding  state-level  data or location  in Union  Territories.
9to the industrial states of Gujarat and Maharashtra.  In terms of sectors, Chemicals. Metals. and Non-
metallic Mineral Products dominated. Almost half of the proposed new plants belonged to industrial
groups.  There were 120 projects proposed to be located in backward districts, and 151 involving foreign
technical collaboration.














c  o  =  A
The aggregate industrv data used in our studv comes from the Annual Survey of Industries (1992-
93) published by the Central Statistical Organization. 6 Data on the number of existing plants. value of
6 This survey  covers  all plants registered  under the Factories  Act of 1948  that a)employ  10 or more  workers and
use power  or b) employ  20 or more  workers  but do not use power.  during the preceding  12 months.
10manufacturing output. number of workers. and manufacturing wage bv state vere derived from this report.
Data on labor disputes is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and relates to work-stoppages
involving 10 or more workers that are exclusive  of political or svmpathetic strikes.
The variable used to measure power shortages is the shortfall in power supplv in 1992-93
experienced by the states in relation to their actual requirements. The data on state-wise energy prices
relates to the cost of generation and supply of power in paisa/kwh.  All this information was obtained from
the CMIE publication "Current Energy Scene in India".
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O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1Data on population. population density and literacy come from the population census of 1991.  The
education variable used is middle-school  enrollment  and was taken from a Planning Commission survey
undertaken for the eighth five year plan.  Information  on road density was obtained from Gupta (1996).
The data on state domestic product and state development  expenditure were obtained from publications of
the Ministry of Finance.  Figure 5 illustrates the state-wvise  variation in income per capita which is
calculated as per capita state domestic  product.
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Figure 6 illustrates the variation in environmental  stringencv across states based on the number of
cases filed by the SPCBs.  The other indicator of environmental regulation available to us was the
proportion of state Plan expenditure on -Environment and Ecology", which is distinct from the
expenditures incurred bv the SPCBs for enforcement as shown in Figure 7.  Both sets of data were taken
from Gupta (1996).  Data sources are summarized in Table 3.










0.01 oB  L-Mll  l 
V.  Results
a.  Basic model
Our core model  is presented in Table 4.  The coefficients on factor pnrces  are not significantlv
different from zero. indicating the low importance attached to them when choosing location. As expected.
the sign on electricity price is negative. We interpret the positive sign on wage to indicate a willingness to
pay for better trained manpower. Labor and energy input prices have not been found to be significant
determninants  of industrial location in the US either.
13Interestingly. the coefficients on power shortages and mandavs lost due to labor disputes are both
significanut  and negative. This supports the hypothesis that it is power availabilitv rather than price that is
perceived to be a constraint bv business.  Also. the potential losses caused by a disruptive labor force
appear to be more important in the cost calculus than the price of labor per se.  It should be mentioned that
Bartik (1985), Levinson (1995). and McConnell  and Schwab (1990) all found a strong negative effect of
union activity in their work on industrial location in the US.
Population density is negative and significant.  This can be interpreted as a gross measure of the
cost of land or the potential damage cost of polluting, but it is not really satisfactorv as either when talking
about entities as large as the states under consideration.  As expected, plants prefer to locate in less densely
populated areas.  At the same time, there are strong agglomeration  effects on the spatial distribution of
industry as evidenced  by the large and significant positive coefficient on the log of manufacturing output.
Thus past govemmental  planning and licensing may well be the ultimate determinants of the pattem of
manufacturing activity in India for decades to come!
State development spending per capita is highly correlated with per capita state domestic product
(per capita income), and has an almost identical  effect wlhen  included in the model in place of the latter.
However. per capita income is a better reflection of the quality of government. infrastructure. and the labor
force.  Hence we use it in our analysis in preference to development  expenditure. The coefficient on it is
positive and significant, as expected.
The coefficient on the number of cases filed by the SPCB. normalized  bv the number of plants in
the state. is positive but not significantly different from zero.  This variable measures an important
dimension of the stringencv of enforcement  of environmental  regulation.  Its lack of significance indicates
that this is probablv not an important factor in business decision making. At the same time. the other
measure of environmental  consciousness - the share of state Plan spending going to the environment - is
positive ald significant.  This points to the possible existence of an underlying -good governance" factor
14that is highly correlated with environmental  spending, and which is attractive to investment. We conjecture
that state governments that are efficiently run. with xvell-knownl.  predictable rules are probably also those
which are environmentallv conscious -- but that from a business point of view. environmental costs pale
before those of poor government.
The coefficient estimates on the three regional dummies - north, south. and west - are all
significantly negative. indicating that after controlling for other factors. new investment rates are higher in
the eastern region (Bihar. West Bengal, and Orissa) than elsewhere. This is a somewhat surprising result,
but is robust to using anv of the other regions as the excluded dummv.
We tried including road densitv in the model as a proxy for the quality of infrastructure in the state.
But since it is highly correlated (0.69) with per capita income and also tended to absorb the effect of the
latter. we dropped it from the regression. In addition, we had a strong prior belief that education levels
would have a significant impact on plant location. Although education is not highly correlated with the
other variables in the regression model. it had a very high standard error and inclusion led to a loss of
significance for almost all other variables.  Hence we decided not to retain it in the model.
In order to control for the magnitude of each project, we interacted the value of capital with
dummies for each of the states (choices). Model 11  reported in Table 4 presents these results. West Bengal
is the excluded choice in the estimation. Parameter signs in the core model remain unchanged, though the
level of significance drops for some variables.  In no case is the coefficient on capital significantlv different
from zero. indicating that invcstment  size makes no difference to which factors affect the location decision.
b.  Special cases
Overall.  we find that our econometric results are fairlv robust to alternative model specifications.
We ran the core specification for different subsets of our data to assess whether particular groups found
different factors more important than others.  For instance. there has been speculation that finns with
15foreign collaboration would be more sensitive to environmental regulation than others. We find no evidence
of this.  Interestingly, firms with foreign collaboration are significantlv more likely to locate in high wage
states: this could reflect the fact that projects involving foreign collaboration also require highly skilled
manpower.
Our sample included too few public sector investment projects to obtain reliable econometric
results. but we note that for the subset of the dataset consisting of public sector plants none of the variables
described above was significantly different from zero, although the overall regression chi square statistic
was significant at the 5% level.
Multiplant firms in the US are thought to search over a wide area to find the best location for a
new plant, whereas single plant firms are usually located where the owner lives (Carlton 1983). Our
results for multiplant firms indicate that their choice calculus is similar to that of single plant firms in most
respects apart from the fact that electricity prices appear to be less important than for single plant firms.
Again. there is little apparent sensitivitv to the stringencv of environmental  regulation as measured by
average prosecution levels.
Finallv, we ran the core model for plants in the five sectors commonlv considered to be the most
polluting: chemicals, metals. non-metallic mineral products. paper. and rubber.  Three things stand out:
first, energy price is negative and very significant, suggesting that polluting sectors are very energy
intensive. Next. the coefficient on per capita income is insignificant.  and finally, environmental litigation
now becomes significant but is still positive. Thus environmental  regulatory stringency does not seem to
play a major adverse role in influencing location decisions, even for the most polluting firms.
We estimated the marginal effects of a  1% increase in the different variables on the probability of
locating in each state.  Table 6 presents these results.  For all states existing business activitv, as measured
by manufacturing output. has the largest marginal impact on location choice. A one percent increase in
existing manufacturing output increases the probabilitv of a new plant locating in Gujarat by 0.64,
16Maharashtra by 0.58. anid  in Madhva Pradesh by 0.36. indicating the strength of agglomeration effects for
these states.  The share of environmental  spending in state Plan expenditure. by contrast. has an impact on
location probability of 0.09 in Gujarat. 0.08 in Maharashtra. and 0.05 in Madhya Pradesh.  Location in
these states is also more sensitive to labor disputes than others.  For instance, in Bihar. West Bengal. and
Orissa a one percent increase in labor disputes only causes a decline in the probabilitv of their being chosen
by new plants of 0.0002, 0.0004 and 0.0004 respectively. But in Gujarat. Maharashtra. and Madhya
Pradesh the respective declines are 0. 16, 0.15 and 0.  10!  The magnitudes and direction of the effect of
power shortages are similar.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper has used establishment level data to empiricallv analyse the determinants of firm
location choice in India during 1994. Our results indicate the overwhelming  importance of existing
business activity as an attractive factor, supporting the thesis of spillover effects and agglomeration
economies in location. At the same time. standard input prices and market related factors do plav a role.
From a policy perspective it is interesting that power availability, and not price, is the significant variable.
Also. the losses due to labor unrest rather than the direct wage costs of labor are significant in our model.
Tlhese  determinants of location choice in India underline the importance of reliable infrastrmcture and
factors of production in the business location decision.
In common with studies of business location in the US. our results do not support the proposition
that businesses choose locations in response to differences in the stringency of environmental regulation
across jurisdictions.  It follows that the likelihood  of an environmental "race to the bottom" in the Indian
context is low. Further work is necessarv to estimate the costs of compliance with regulations in India. It
is clear from our study. though, that the costs imposed by environmental  regulation are not large enough to
overpower other costs of doing business and thus that thev are not critical determinants of location choice.
17Table 1:  Summary Statistics
(Number of Observations: 5852)
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev  |Min  Max
State manufacturing  25008.21  5560.517  15199  38478
wage (Rs.)  .
Electricity cost  111  23.00507  74  159
(Paisa/Kwh)
Power shortage (%)  9.357143  9.68592  2  37
Mandays lost due to  2207  4409.689  39  17666
labor disputes ('000s)
Output (Rs.)  2507425  1778763  766321  7807251
Cases  416.2143  578.9563  5  2345
Plan environmental  0.0105  0.0134  0.0000977  0.0514
exp./Total Plan exp.
(%)  _  _  _
Per capita income  6462.357  2381.404  3280  10857
(Rs.)
Population density  367.751  194.0239  128.5651  766.1799
(per sq. km)
18Table 2: Correlation  Matrix
Wage  Energy  Power  Disputes  Output  Case  Plan Env.  Per  Population  Road  Education
Costs  Shortage  per  Exp./Tot.  Capita  Density  Density,
Plant  Plan Exp  Income
Wage  1.000  l
Energy  0.564  1.000
Costs  I
Pow-er  0.216  0.1281  1.000
Shortage
Disputes  0.161  0.226  -0.292  1.000  .
Output  0.243  0.280  -0.103  0.01()  1.000  _  .
Case per  0.284  0.416  -0.332  -0.281  0.1)00 100
Plant  .
Plan Env.  0.000  -0.355  0.040  -0.340  -0.488  - 1.000
Exp./Tot.  0.011
Plan Exp  _  .
Per Capita  -0.012  -0.090  -0.575  0.058  0.404  0.439  -0.191  1.000
Income  I
Population  -0.085  0.200  0.045  0.557  0.008  - -0.344  -0.030  1.000
Density  _______  _________  ________  0.098
Road  0.040  0.287  -0.389  -0.079  0.594  0.542  -0.288  0.695  -0.126  1.000
Density
Education  -0.107  -0.165  -0.515  0.285  0.212  - -0.088  0.406  0.396  0.056  1.000
0.096  .
19Table 3: Data Sources
Data  Source
Manufacturing Wage Bill (per state in '00.000  Annual Survev of Industries. 1992-93
rupees). 1992-93
Maiiufacturing Employment by state  Annual Survey of Industries. 1992-93
Energy Costs (paisa per kwh) 1991-92  CMIE: Current Energy Scene in India. 1994
Power Shortage (percent), 1992-93  CMIE: Current Energy Scene in India. 1994
Industnral  Disputes, (mandavs lost in  000's),  Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1994
1992
Value of Manufacturing Output (in  00.000  Annual Survey of Industries, 1992-93
rupees), 1992-93
Environmental Cases Registered Against Plants  Gupta  1996
(Air+Water), 1992-1995
Environmental Plan Expenditure (in millions of  Gupta 1996. Planning Commission
rupees), 1993-94
Total Plan Expenditure (in millions of Rupees)  Economic Survev of India, 1994-95
Per Capita Income (in rupees), 1992-93  Economic Survev of India, 1994-95
Population Density, 1991  Population Census. 1991
Road Density (per '000 sq  kns)  1989  Gupta 1996, CMIE 1995
Education (percent enrolled in middle  Department of Education, 1992-93
school), 1992-93  _
20Table 4:  Conditional  Logit Estimation (Core Models)
Independent  Model I  Model II
variables (in logs)
Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat
Manufacturing Wage  0.874  1.879  0.223  0.368
Electricitv Cost  -1.807  -1.902  -1.333  -1.169
Power Shortage  -0.703  -3.063**  -0.301  -0.976
Mandavs lost due to  -0.685  -3.702**  -0.300  -1.206
disputes  _
Output  2.670  5.93**  1.905  333**
Cases per Plant  0.053  0.485  0.121  0.878
Plan Env. Exp./Total  0.3  73  3.849**  0.231  1.863
Plan Exp.
Per Capita Income  0.841  2.606**  0.485  1.209
Population Densitv  -0.463  -2.17*  -0.583  -2.179*
South  -2.640  -4.2**  -1.531  -1.942
West  -4.860  -4.45**  -2.720  -1.939
North  -3.101  -4.631**  -1.797  -2.104*
AP*CAP  -0.001  -1.289
BIH*CAP  _  -0.002  -1.005
GUJ*CAP  -0.0002  -0.74
HAR*CAP  -0.002  -1.309
KAR*CAP  -0.0001  -0.399
KER*CAP  -0.001  -0.735
MP*CAP  -0.0004  -1.047
MAH*CAP  -0.0005  -1.272
ORI*CAP  4.98E-06  0.012
PUN*CAP  -0.0002  -0.535
RAJ*CAP  -0.001  -1.214
TN*CAP  -0.0003  -(.731
UP*CAP  -0.0002  -0.463
Log Likelihood  -996  -992
Chi  Square  213  222
Prob.  Chi>0  0.000  0.000
Pseudo R2  0.09  0.10
Observations  5852  5852
* significant  at 1%'Yo  confidence level
* significant at 5% confidence level
21Table 5: Conditional Logit Model (Special Cases)
Model  Multiplant Firms  Plants with Foreign  Public Sector Plants  Polluting Sector Plants
Collaboration
Independent  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat
Variables (in logs)  _  _  __
Manufacturing Wage  1.553  1.894  2.479  2.534**  -0.465  -0.311  0.607  1.121
Electricity Cost  -0.692  -0.393  -3.675  -2.195*  -2.741  -0.686  -3.716  -3.137**
Power Shortage  -0.777  -1.921  -1.401  -2.831 **  -0.448  -0.757  -0.788  -2.977**
Mandays lost due to  -0.924  -2.816**  -1.107  -2.889**  0.017  0.031  -0.569  -2.577**
disputes
Output  3.707  5.165**  3.830  4.506**  1.584  0.75  3.571  6.325**
Cases per Plant  0.028  0.149  0.072  0.336  0.346  0.736  0.324  2.243*
Plan Env. Exp./Total  0.578  3.803**  0.517  2.748**  0.0780  0.218  0.452  3.744**
Plan Exp.  .
Per Capita Income  1.262  2.053*  0.900  1.498  0.312  0.274  0.152  0.353
Population Density  -1.136  -2.24  *  -0.223  -0.59  0.286  0.423  -0.834  -3.102**
South  -3.345  -3.254**  -4.121  -3.564**  -2.452  -0.916  -3.720  -5.014**
West  -6.794  -3.779**  -7.770  -3.675**  -3.186  -0.682  -6.550  -4.919**
North  -3.826  -3.514**  -4.680  -3.701**  -3.382  -1.258  -4.269  -5.241**
Log Likelihood  -447  -348  -87  -653
Chi Squared  165  99  21  161
Prob. Chi>0  0.00  0.00  0.048  0.000
Pseudo R2  0.15  0.12  0.10  0.10
4_~~~~~~~~ Observations  2814  211  518  3892
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  4  . . _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
**significant  at 1% confidence level
* significant at 5% confidence level
22Table  6:  Marginal impact on location probability  of a I % change in different factors
State  Percent  Estimated  Wage  Power  Electricity  Value of  Population Mandays  Plan  Cases  Per capita
of new  probability  shortage  cost  inanfg.  density  lost due to  environment  per  income
plants  of locating in  output  disputes  al  Exp.  plant
the state  /Total Plan
Exp
AP  0.0622  0.0112  0.0109  -0.0088  -0.0226  0.0334  -0.0058  -0.0086  0.0047  0.0007  0.0105
BIH  0.0167  0.0007  0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0004  0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0001  0.0000  0.0002
GUi  0.2129  0.2313  0.2097  -0.1686  -0.4332  0.6402  -0.1111  -0.1642  0.0896  0.0128  0.2018
HAR  0.0215  0.0021  0.0058  -0.0047  -0.0120  0.0178  -0.0031  -0.00461  0.0025  0.0004  0.0056
KAR  0.0789  0.0075  0.0138  -0.0111  -0.0285  0.0421  -0.0073  -0.01081  0.0059  0.0008  0.0133
KER  0.0144  0.0005  0.0026  -0.0021  -0.0054  0.0080  -0.0014  -0.0020  0.0011  0.0002  0.0025
MP  (.(909  0.0193  0.1230  -0.0989  -0.2542  0.3757  -0.0652  -0.0963  0.0526  0.0075  0.1184
MAH  0.1722  0.5281  0.1911  -0.1537  -0.3949  0.5836  -0.1013  -0.1497  0.0817  0.0117  0.1840
ORI  0.0455  0.0002  0.0006  -0.0005  -0.0012  0.0017  -0.0003  -0.0004  0.0002  0.0000  0.0006
PUN  0.0526  0.0172  0.0147  -0.0118  -0.0303  0.0448  -0.0078  -0.0115  0.0063  0.0009  0.0141
RAJ  0.0431  0.0029  0.0121  -0.0098  -0.0251  0.0370  -0.0064  -0.0095  0.0052  0.0007  0.0117
TN  0.0694  0.1680  0.0121  -0.0097  -0.0250  0.0369  -0.0064  -0.0095  0.0052  0.0007  0.0116
UP  0.0766  0.0104  0,0210  -0.0169  -0.0434  0.0641  -0.0111  -0.0164  0.0090  0.0013  0.0202
WB  0.0431  0.0005  0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0011  0.0017  -0.0003  -0.0004  0.0002  0.0000  0.0005
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